The State of the Union: A View from Japan
February 5, 2003
By Yone Sugita
President Bush's State of the Union address is, of course,
directed primarily at a domestic audience, yet the speech was heard all
over the world. It should not
be surprising, however, that Americans and non-Americans may have heard
vastly different things in what was said.
Take the question of "weapons of mass
destruction" (WMD). President
Bush said that what the world feared most was the fact that “outlaw
regimes” sought to obtain and use weapons of mass destruction, including
nuclear weapons. There is a
slightly different perspective here in Asia.
You cannot tell others not to smoke a cigarette while you are
smoking thousands of packs every day.
Why should the United States continue nuclear weapons tests while
telling others, including not only “outlaw regimes” but also some
important allies such as South Korea and Japan, not to seek to possess
nuclear weapons? The blatant
inconsistency of American policy toward WMD issues (why are certain states
who possess WMD threats yet others are "responsible powers") has
precipitated reasonable doubt and discontent with U. S. leadership in the
international arena, not only among Washington's enemies but also among
its friends and allies.
Historically, the main method the United States used to
acquire and maintain its global leadership has been a confrontational
approach: Find the enemy, create a simple dichotomous world view between
good and bad, and forge an image of severe confrontation against the enemy
in order to solidify its own allies.
Terrorists and their supporters are the next enemies,
following "Hitlerism, militarism, and communism."
President Bush declared: “Once again we are called to defend the
safety of our people and the hopes of all mankind. And
we accept this responsibility.” It
is not entirely clear, however, whether the rest of the world has
consented to the United States taking on this role.
In last year’s State of the Union Address, President
Bush stated that Iran, North Korea, Iraq, and “their terrorist allies”
constituted “an axis of evil” without any clear evidence that these
countries had “terrorist allies.”
A respectable world leader would not use such a vulgar expression,
which was infra dignitatem. He
did not use such a coarse expression this year, but promoted a
clear stratification among the members of “an axis of evil.”
“Disarming Iraq” constituted one independent section in his
address, while he spared only one paragraph for Iran and two paragraphs
for North Korea--North Korea, which after all has admitted
that it violated the Agreed Framework of 1994 and secretly pursued its
nuclear development project. It
does appear that Washington recognizes that North Korea is a different
sort of challenge. General Gary Luck, the American commander in Korea, testified
before a Senate committee that, in the event of a war with North Korea,
the United States would suffer from 80,000 – 100,000 American casualties
and over $100 billion worth of economic losses.
North Korea has the fifth-largest military in the world (over 1
million armed forces in comparison with about 430,000 men in Iraq) with
numerous short- medium- and long-range artilleries, multiple rocket
launchers, and ballistic missiles equipped with biological and chemical
warheads located within a short distance from Seoul and Tokyo, the capital
cities of America's most critical allies in Asia.
Objectively speaking, North Korea seems to pose more serious and
immediate threats to the United States and its allies in Asia.
Nonetheless, President Bush explained his policies in a rather calm
tone: “The North Korean regime will find respect in the world, and
revival for its people, only when it turns away from its nuclear
ambitions.”
In comparison with this softer mode, President Bush
delivered a quasi-ultimatum to Iraq.
In contrast to the open confession by the North Korean regime of
its nuclear program, President Bush has to depend on “intelligence
sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody”
as evidence to find the connections between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda. The President could only say that Hussein supported
terrorists “including members of Al-Qaeda” without demonstrating
clearly if Hussein systematically helped Al-Qaeda or has any direct
connection with the September 11th terrorist attacks.
President Bush could only imagine the worst case without solid,
hard evidence: “Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one
of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own.”
Since Secretary of State Colin Powell is supposed to show us
intelligence information concerning Iraqi’s links to terrorist groups on
February 5, we shall refrain from making definitive analysis and judgment
on this issue until then.
President Bush said, “We will consult, but let there be
no misunderstanding: . . . we will lead a coalition to disarm him.”
Now, world opinion favors avoiding war against Iraq.
Even within the United States, some conscientious voices against
the military solution of the Iraqi issue rose to surface.
It is getting more difficult to form a solid coalition to support
U.S. military involvement in Iraq and quite risky for the Bush
administration to implement a unilateral, military solution without secure
endorsement both at home and abroad.
If the United States undertakes a military attack against Iraq
without firm consensus, it will lose confidence and trust of the
international community including its friends and allies, further isolate
itself from the world community, and become a self-appointed, ruthless,
yet lonely policeman. The
United States may have enormous military power, but it will find itself
without any true friends or allies in the international community.
Finally, it bears noting that President Bush reaffirmed
and justified his first-strike principle.
As long as the United States continues to blame on others without
trying to find out why they are hated abroad, the country will have to
live under threat, confrontation, and anxiety for a long time to come.
From this side of the Pacific, it seems that if Kim Jong-il and
Saddam Hussein used the same logic, they could justify their preemptive
attacks against the United States or any other nation that they defined as
“terrorists and tyrants.” This
first-strike doctrine is nothing but a symbol of the self-centered
approach of the United States.
And this is a matter of concern to us and to many around
the world. In Japan, many of
us feel that the spread of the technology that permits the construction of
WMD is inevitable. Forcible
suppression is a short-sighted strategy.
The U.S. should instead be taking the lead in reducing tensions
(perhaps even by cutting back on its own massive stockpiles of WMD).
In turn, we look for greater self-contemplation and self-restraint
on Washington's part.
Yone Sugita is an associate professor of American history
at the Osaka University of Foreign Studies.