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After Saddam
Hussein: America and the Muslim World
Jonathan Eric
Lewis
Although many
commentators predicted that the capture and subsequent
videotape of Saddam Hussein would only serve to
“humiliate” the world’s Muslims, it is readily apparent
that, both in regard to Saddam’s fate and their attitude
toward the Bush Administration, the world’s Muslims are
far from united in support of Saddam and against
Washington.
Abdul Nabi Salman of
Bahrain’s House of Deputies
called the capture of Saddam
“a great day for the
Iraqi people and all freedom lovers around the world.”
The editorial staff of ShiaNews.com expressed
their
gratitude “to the coalition forces” for hunting down
Saddam Hussein. Tashbih Sayyed, editor of Pakistan
Today, was event more blunt: “There
is a lesson in Saddam's capture. People who pretend to
be brave and heroic by muzzling the voice of dissent are
those who basically lack honor.”
Although the
repercussions of Saddam’s capture are as yet unknown,
one thing is abundantly clear: the Bush Administration
now has a unique opportunity to engage in a much needed
dialogue with moderate and secular Muslims from around
the world and to demonstrate that
Washington’s
promotion of democracy overseas can be compatible with
Islamic notions of justice.
In an oft-cited memo of October 2003, Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld questioned whether the United
States should help fund a private foundation that would
counteract the anti-American forces of Wahabbism in
Islamic schools around the globe. Rumsfeld, attuned to
the need to respond to the extremism promulgated in many
Saudi-funded mosques, did raise a serious question with
regard to the war of ideas that the United States now
faces in the Muslim world.
With the capture and
forthcoming trial of Saddam Hussein, however,
Washington should
rely less upon funding Islamic centers that adhere to
traditional, rather than Wahabbi Islam, than in engaging
the increasing number of emerging Muslim reformist
intellectuals and thoughtful clerics who were given a
much-needed emotional boost by Washington’s
steadfastness in Iraq. Given that the future of
Coalition success in nation-building in Iraq depends
largely upon its ability to engage with the Shiites and
the Kurds, Washington should use this auspicious moment
to create a political understanding between the United
States and Muslim Iraqis that combines the best of
Jeffersonian democracy and liberal Islamic
jurisprudence, a notion made even more pertinent given
the fact Karbala and Najaf, the two holiest cities of
Shiite Islam, were liberated from an anti-Shiite fanatic
by an American-led military coalition.
The Bush
Administration has an opportunity to show that the
capture and forthcoming trial of Saddam Hussein
demonstrates that
Washington
understands that many Muslims perceived Saddam to be a
despot. It must also not squander the opportunity to
open a dialogue with reformist intellectuals,
particularly Shiites, in pro-American regimes such as
Bahrain and Kuwait. Washington’s embrace of Shiite
political power in Iraq will be a cause of much
political discussion in Bahrain, now the only majority
Shiite Arab country ruled by a Sunni. The capture of
Saddam will also, undoubtedly, have a major impact on
American relations with Iran, a country whose leadership
is at once relieved to see the downfall of Saddam’s
regime and wary of American power and its commitment to
following through with its promises. The American
relationship with moderate Iraqi Shiites, while a threat
to the hardliners in Teheran, could nevertheless prove
to be an important occasion for a long-delayed dialogue
between the Bush Administration and more reformist
Muslim clerics in Iran.
Washington could also use this moment to engage with
large and significant non-Arab Muslim communities
throughout the world. Rather than funding schools to
counter Wahabbi agitation, the United States should fund
radio broadcasts and diplomatic outreach efforts that
engage with the large Muslim communities of the former
Soviet Union. Rather than perceiving America’s
dialogue with the Muslim world as a dialogue with only
Arabs, Washington should do its best to engage with
leading clerics and intellectuals from myriad Muslim
groups such as the Bosnians, Sufi Chechens, Circassians
of the Sunni Hanafi school, Tajiks, and Uzbeks.
The Bush Administration would likewise be wise to
appoint a Muslim-American, perhaps an Albanian-American
or a Kurdish-American, as an official envoy to the
Muslim communities of the Balkans and Central Asia who
could work with these groups to better understand their
perceptions of American policy toward Islam and to
demonstrate that the “War on Terror” is not a war on
Islam. Such a move could also include leading American
Christian leaders and rabbis in the hope of fostering a
sincere interfaith dialogue that would help stem the
tide of some misperceptions on both sides of the divide.
It is fundamentally in America’s national interest that
Washington begins a multi-faceted dialogue with the
Muslim world. Such a project would likely cost a
significant amount of money, but its cost would be far
outweighed by the possibility of recovering from another
major terrorist attack brought upon by Muslim
extremists. Saddam’s capture can be, paraphrasing
Lebanese-American scholar Walid Phares, a Ceausescu
moment – a moment when dictatorship gives way to an
emerging democracy. The success of the American mission
in Iraq and the countering of Islamic militancy and
dictatorships falsely using the banner of Islam for
political legitimacy depends not just on the dedication
and skill of the men and women of our armed forces, but
also in America’s ability to communicate the very best
of its ideals and values to the long-suffering people of
the Middle East and the Muslim world.
Jonathan Eric Lewis is an analyst and journalist
specializing in the history and politics of ethnic and
religious minorities from the Middle East.
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