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From
the Caspian to the Mediterranean: The East-West Energy
Corridor is Becoming a Reality
Zeyno
Baran
This
week, Azerbaijan’s President Haydar Aliyev brought
Azerbaijani, Georgian and Turkish officials with him to
Washington to deliver a progress report on the two legs
of the strategic “East-West Energy Corridor”—the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the Shah
Deniz gas pipeline. In his opinion—a point of view
shared by many in Washington—there are several reasons
why these export routes are considered to be of
strategic significance to the Western world.
For
starters, Azerbaijan is a non-OPEC, non-Middle Eastern
source of oil that is incrementally important for global
supply diversification. Right now, Azerbaijan is
exporting oil via Russia and via Georgia.
Starting in 2005, once the $2.9 billion BTC
pipeline crossing Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey is
completed, Azerbaijan will export 1 million barrels a
day more. Moreover, Azerbaijan believes that exporting
oil via a NATO member—Turkey—brings additional
political and security benefits.
Initially,
the United States supported these two projects because
it believed that alternate export routes that did not
run through Russia would help Azerbaijan and Georgia
strengthen their independence.
Moreover, it hoped to use these projects as an
engine to drive regional economic development. Given the
political instability of the south Caucasus, its bad
investment climate and high level corruption in
Azerbaijan and Georgia, the successful implementation of
these projects is crucial if additional, non-energy
investment to come. Even though Azerbaijan is blessed
with significant hydrocarbon deposits, the
"resource curse" is a real danger, and Baku
hopes to use its Oil Fund to spur other development
projects. Georgia,
of course, has limited resources of its own, other than
being a transit country for Caspian energy.
Both
pipelines are managed by a consortium of oil companies,
led by British Petroleum (BP). In fact, BP’s
investment in the Caspian, and recent acquisition of a
major stake in Russia's Tyumen Oil Company (TNK), has
turned Eurasia into one of their top priorities.
Thus, BP now has a stake in improving relations
between Russia and the south Caucasus, especially the
Moscow-Tbilisi relationship.
At
a February 25, 2003 presentation at The Nixon Center,
Gia Chanturia, president of the Georgian
International Oil Corporation, maintained that the
export routes to Turkey should not be viewed as
anti-Russian. In
fact, he predicted that there will be increased
cooperation between Georgia, Russia and Turkey
concerning oil exports. Given Russia's own increase of
its oil exports, and the importance of oil revenue for
the Russian economy, existing Russian routes cannot
handle all of the increased volume.
In addition, weather conditions at the
Novorossiisk port have seriously limited export
potential to European markets.
He has proposed the construction of an additional
pipeline from Novorossiisk, via the Georgian port of
Supsa, to link with the Turkish port of Ceyhan (the
terminus of the Baku line).
This would enable Russia to increase its oil
export potential without interruption either because of
poor weather at Novorossiisk or because of problems in
the dangerously narrow and already overcrowded Turkish
straits. It
would also bring additional incentives to the table for
both Russians and Georgians to improve relations.
Yurdakul
Yigitguden, Undersecretary at the Turkish Ministry of
Energy—someone who has worked on these projects for
over five years—also spoke at The Nixon Center about
Turkey’s main interests in these projects. The BTC
line will reduce greatly the amount of oil that has to
cross the dangerously narrow Turkish straits, which is a
key concern for Turkey, but not much appreciated
elsewhere. In fact, many of the environmental NGOs
opposing the BTC project barely note one of the reasons
the oil consortium chose this expensive pipeline route
was to avoid an environmental disaster, literally in the
midst of Istanbul itself.
With
these oil and gas projects from Caspian, as well as
Russia, and the Middle East, Turkey is also becoming an
energy hub for the region. Turkey has cooperated closely
with the United States in promoting these projects, in
part to broaden its bilateral strategic partnership to
include political and economic aspects as well. While
helping the Caucasian and Central Asian countries
strengthen their independence, Turkey has also worked
closely with Russia, believing that the two goals are
not mutually exclusive. In fact, the Blue Stream gas
pipeline from Russia to Turkey has started to function
this week.
The
Shah Deniz gas pipeline, which is expected to be
sanctioned later in February, will help Azerbaijan,
Georgia and Turkey diversify their gas resources. The
initial phase of the project—including the
construction of the pipeline—is
estimated to cost about $3.2 billion. The
gas project is especially importance for Georgia because
Georgia is fully dependent on Russian gas, and at
politically tense times, the supplies have not been
reliable.
For
Turkey, Shah Deniz’s second phase—from Turkey to
Europe—is strategically even more important. Turkey
and Greece have been working on interconnecting their
gas networks, and this week they finalized the
intergovernmental agreement for gas transport that will
start in 2006. Turkey hopes to re-export gas also to
Austria, Hungary, Romania as well as Italy. Greece hopes
to link up to Macedonia and Serbia as well. Given the
European Union’s interest in its own gas supply
diversification, Azerbaijan’s gas could be a good
incremental source.
For
all three countries the big challenge is to use these
projects to promote transparency and accountability. The
hope is that these pipelines will help, and not hinder,
with regional stability and security. The involvement of
international financial institutions—such as the IFC
and the EBRD—will also assure highest possible
environmental, social and security standards.
After
many years, the east-west energy corridor is becoming a
reality, and one that will benefit both the nations of
the region and help to ensure the energy security of the
Western world.
Zeyno
Baran is director of the International Energy and
Security Program at The Nixon Center.
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