From
the Caspian to the Mediterranean: The East-West Energy Corridor is
Becoming a Reality
February
26, 2003
By Zeyno Baran
This week,
Azerbaijan’s President Haydar Aliyev brought Azerbaijani, Georgian and
Turkish officials with him to Washington to deliver a progress report on
the two legs of the strategic “East-West Energy Corridor”—the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
(BTC) oil pipeline and the Shah Deniz gas pipeline. In his opinion—a
point of view shared by many in Washington—there are several reasons why
these export routes are considered to be of strategic significance to the
Western world.
For starters,
Azerbaijan is a non-OPEC, non-Middle Eastern source of oil that is
incrementally important for global supply diversification. Right now,
Azerbaijan is exporting oil via Russia and via Georgia.
Starting in 2005, once the $2.9 billion BTC pipeline crossing
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey is completed, Azerbaijan will export 1
million barrels a day more. Moreover, Azerbaijan believes that exporting
oil via a NATO member—Turkey—brings additional political and security
benefits.
Initially, the
United States supported these two projects because it believed that
alternate export routes that did not run through Russia would help
Azerbaijan and Georgia strengthen their independence.
Moreover, it hoped to use these projects as an engine to drive
regional economic development. Given the political instability of the
south Caucasus, its bad investment climate and high level corruption in
Azerbaijan and Georgia, the successful implementation of these projects is
crucial if additional, non-energy investment to come. Even though
Azerbaijan is blessed with significant hydrocarbon deposits, the
"resource curse" is a real danger, and Baku hopes to use its Oil
Fund to spur other development projects.
Georgia, of course, has limited resources of its own, other than
being a transit country for Caspian energy.
Both pipelines are
managed by a consortium of oil companies, led by British Petroleum (BP).
In fact, BP’s investment in the Caspian, and recent acquisition of a
major stake in Russia's Tyumen Oil Company (TNK), has turned Eurasia into
one of their top priorities. Thus,
BP now has a stake in improving relations between Russia and the south
Caucasus, especially the Moscow-Tbilisi relationship.
At a February 25,
2003 presentation at The Nixon Center,
Gia Chanturia, president of the Georgian International Oil
Corporation, maintained that the export routes to Turkey should not be
viewed as anti-Russian. In
fact, he predicted that there will be increased cooperation between
Georgia, Russia and Turkey concerning oil exports. Given Russia's own
increase of its oil exports, and the importance of oil revenue for the
Russian economy, existing Russian routes cannot handle all of the
increased volume. In
addition, weather conditions at the Novorossiisk port have seriously
limited export potential to European markets.
He has proposed the construction of an additional pipeline from
Novorossiisk, via the Georgian port of Supsa, to link with the Turkish
port of Ceyhan (the terminus of the Baku line).
This would enable Russia to increase its oil export potential
without interruption either because of poor weather at Novorossiisk or
because of problems in the dangerously narrow and already overcrowded
Turkish straits. It would
also bring additional incentives to the table for both Russians and
Georgians to improve relations.
Yurdakul Yigitguden,
Undersecretary at the Turkish Ministry of Energy—someone who has worked
on these projects for over five years—also spoke at The Nixon Center
about Turkey’s main interests in these projects. The BTC line will
reduce greatly the amount of oil that has to cross the dangerously narrow
Turkish straits, which is a key concern for Turkey, but not much
appreciated elsewhere. In fact, many of the environmental NGOs opposing
the BTC project barely note one of the reasons the oil consortium chose
this expensive pipeline route was to avoid an environmental disaster,
literally in the midst of Istanbul itself.
With these oil and
gas projects from Caspian, as well as Russia, and the Middle East, Turkey
is also becoming an energy hub for the region. Turkey has cooperated
closely with the United States in promoting these projects, in part to
broaden its bilateral strategic partnership to include political and
economic aspects as well. While helping the Caucasian and Central Asian
countries strengthen their independence, Turkey has also worked closely
with Russia, believing that the two goals are not mutually exclusive. In
fact, the Blue Stream gas pipeline from Russia to Turkey has started to
function this week.
The Shah Deniz gas
pipeline, which is expected to be sanctioned later in February, will help
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey diversify their gas resources. The initial
phase of the project—including the construction of the pipeline—is
estimated to cost about $3.2 billion. The
gas project is especially importance for Georgia because Georgia is fully
dependent on Russian gas, and at politically tense times, the supplies
have not been reliable.
For Turkey, Shah
Deniz’s second phase—from Turkey to Europe—is strategically even
more important. Turkey and Greece have been working on interconnecting
their gas networks, and this week they finalized the intergovernmental
agreement for gas transport that will start in 2006. Turkey hopes to
re-export gas also to Austria, Hungary, Romania as well as Italy. Greece
hopes to link up to Macedonia and Serbia as well. Given the European
Union’s interest in its own gas supply diversification, Azerbaijan’s
gas could be a good incremental source.
For all three
countries the big challenge is to use these projects to promote
transparency and accountability. The hope is that these pipelines will
help, and not hinder, with regional stability and security. The
involvement of international financial institutions—such as the IFC and
the EBRD—will also assure highest possible environmental, social and
security standards.
After many years,
the east-west energy corridor is becoming a reality, and one that will
benefit both the nations of the region and help to ensure the energy
security of the Western world.
Zeyno Baran is
director of the International Energy and Security Program at The Nixon
Center.
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