The Threats We Face: Perspectives from
Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski
April 28, 2004
By Zbigniew Brzezinski
Henry Kissinger:
The most immediate
threat is Iraq. The most long term threat is the evolution of the
international system where, on the one hand, you have shifts in the
definition of great powers and, on the other, you have the creation of
vacuums within countries which make it possible for terrorist groups and
other non-state organizations to threaten the international system without
the restraints of the international system.
It appears mostly as
a threat to the United States because the United States has been most active
in resisting it and also because the United States is a great symbol of the
kind of society that the terrorists are trying to undermine. So any success
they can have in the United States simultaneously frightens a larger number
of people than a similar operation would in Canada or any other allied
country. But the nature of the threat is really fairly uniform. We’ve had
terrorist attacks now in Berlin, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Spain,
Uzbekistan, Russia – all in the space of two years. So we are talking about
a global tendency, not a particular American problem.
The United States
has not been equally successful in convincing other nations of the
importance of the role that it is playing. Part of that is America’s fault;
part of it is due to the fact that other nations do not have the same
experience of danger nor do they react to it like Americans did, because, at
least in Europe, they’re used to danger and Americans are not used to
attacks on their own country. And especially not by people they never knew
were enemies.
Zbigniew Brzezinski:
I think the greatest
security threat to the United States stems from the increasing isolation of
the Untied States in the world, the crisis of American credibility and the
focusing of a variety of complex and disparate resentments on the United
States itself, with the growing probability of more terrorist strikes
against the United States.
And the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to various rogue groups is a
future problem. So far, assertions that this has happened have been not
proven to be all that accurate, as we all too painfully know. And we have to
be very careful when we speak of weapons of mass destruction because the
administration has been indiscriminate in its definition of the meaning of
those words.
I think we have to
be very careful in thinking about the future with the present and
particularly not to slide into panicky, gross exaggerations which have the
effect, I think, one, of inducing fear which is not a good basis for making
decisions, and secondly, perhaps even producing self-fulfilling prophesies.
This is not an argument for minimizing threats, but it is an argument for
differentiating threats and particularly for differentiating threats of
today from possible threats of tomorrow.
Dealing with the
manifest problems of the world of which terror is both a manifestation as
well as a symptom, we really need friends. I often say that we are
preponderant in the world today, but preponderance is not omnipotence. And I
think the best proof of that is what is happening in Iraq. It took us
practically no effort to defeat that regime because it was weak. It wasn’t
armed with weapons of mass destruction, as we claimed. It only took three
American divisions three weeks to overthrow that regime. And yet, a year
later, we’re up to our necks in problems and the reason is that we have
transformed a military success into a political setback because we’ve been
unwilling to engage others with us - the United Nations, our principal
allies and so forth. And I hope we learn something from that because
otherwise we run the risk of repeating it.
Most of the problems
we confront in the world cannot be solved by American power alone even
though American power is indispensable to their solution.
This essay is
based on the interviews conducted by Steve Paikin, Host of Diplomatic
Immunity, a television program of TVOntario (http://www.tvontario.org/), on
April 14, 2004. Used with permission.
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