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Remember Pakistan?
Sara Kupfer
The blame game surrounding the 9/11 Commission hearings
and the developing situation in Iraq has overshadowed
serious analysis of a crucial country in the U.S.-led
war on terror: Pakistan. While the Bush Administration
has portrayed Pakistan as part of the solution in the
war on terror, it might also be part of the problem.
Indeed, the most urgent threat to U.S. national security
in the past few years was not Saddam’s Iraq, but
Musharraf’s Pakistan. Consider only that Al-Qaeda was
founded there; that Pakistan continues to provide safe
haven to hundreds of Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters; that
its fundamentalist madrasas are flourishing; and,
most disturbingly, that Pakistan possesses nuclear
weapons, which, as the A.Q. Khan scandal has shockingly
revealed, are not as “leak-proof” as Musharraf continues
to insist.
Moreover, members of Pakistan’s powerful secret service,
the ISI, have ties to Islamist fundamentalist groups,
including Al-Qaeda. We know, for example, that General
Ahmad Mahmood, the chief of the Pakistani secret
services at the time of the 9/11 attacks, helped finance
them by asking one of his subordinates to transfer
$100,000 to hijacker Mohammed Atta. Although Mahmood has
been forced to retire under pressure of the U.S.
government, he remains a free man, and the Pakistani
government does not seem eager to investigate his
involvement in the attacks any further.
Furthermore, there is strong evidence that members of
Pakistan’s nuclear establishment are ardent adherents to
the Islamist cause. Some of Pakistan’s leading nuclear
scientists, as well as A.Q. Khan, intimated that the
bomb is not just meant to protect Pakistan’s national
borders but the entire Islamic world. The New York
Times recently reported that a senior Pakistani
politician recently quoted Khan as saying that “giving
technology to a Muslim country was not a crime.” Indeed,
the bomb in Pakistan has become a religious icon, with
editorials in Islamist newspapers praising the bomb as a
blessing from God. In December 2001, the CIA confirmed
that two of Pakistan’s top nuclear scientists and direct
subordinates of A.Q. Khan had met with Osama bin Laden
in Kabul in August of the same year. The Pakistani
government has questioned, but never prosecuted the
scientists.
Musharraf’s role in A.Q. Khan’s black market operations
remains dubious to say the least. Considering that
Pakistani nuclear scientists are being closely monitored
by the country’s police and military intelligence
services, it is inconceivable that Pakistani scientists
could have met with members of Al-Qaeda and foreign
government officials without acquiescence from the top.
Recently, Massoud Ansari reported in The New Republic
that A.Q. Khan’s daughter, Dina, is in possession of
documents and audiotapes that provide evidence that
Musharraf and senior army officials had known about A.Q.
Khan’s nuclear proliferation activities for years. So
much for America’s ally Pakistan.
Back in Washington, the Bush Administration so far has
been very protective of the Musharraf government. Of
course, Bush’s relative silence on the matter may be due
to domestic concerns. Keeping a lid on the danger of a
vital “ally” to international security is in the
interest of the Bush reelection team. After all, the A.
Q. Khan scandal has revealed that members of the
Pakistani military establishment have traded nuclear
secrets to countries belonging to “axis of evil”
countries—and perhaps even to Al-Qaeda itself. In other
words, Pakistan’s key role in the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction provides Bush’s opponents
with another angle from which to criticize the war in
Iraq as having been not only an unnecessary and costly
distraction from the war on terror, but also a dangerous
one.
A more pressing reason the Bush Administration is being
protective of the Musharraf government is that
Washington needs Islamabad’s cooperation to track down
Bin Laden. Also, the Bush Administration seems to be
taking a similar tack as with Russia: be silent in
public and critical in private. In return, it appears
that Pakistan has begun to share some of its extensive
knowledge of the workings of Al-Qaeda and to assert much
tighter control over its nuclear program and export
activities. For perfectly realist reasons, then, a more
confrontational attitude with Pakistan simply is not
advisable. Besides, it does not fit into Bush’s
reelection strategy.
But the Bush Administration still needs to ensure that
Musharraf fulfills his promise to purge the ISI and the
military of radical Islamist elements. Granted,
Musharraf has dismissed some of the more notorious key
figures in the ISI in the aftermath of 9/11 (although
nominally “retired” generals—such as the fiercely
anti-American former head of the ISI, Hamid Gul—may
still be exerting their influence over the services from
the privacy of their homes). Moreover, Musharraf has so
far failed to extend his Islamist purges down to the
lower ranks of the secret services, and it appears that
Islamist infiltration in the lower ranks of these organs
of state power is the front through which Islamists
control much of
Pakistan.
In a way, this is good news, believes Marin J. Strmecki,
currently of the Smith Richardson Foundation, for it
means that radical Islamism today is much more
widespread among members of the ISI than it is among the
Pakistani population at large.
Similarly, Stephen Cohen, of the Brookings Institution,
suggests that the United States has no other choice but
to work with the Pakistani government and try to wean it
away from supporting Islamist extremists. At the same
time, Cohen suggests that the United States undertake
other measures to lower the possibility for an Islamist
take-over of the Pakistani government and the country’s
nuclear arsenal. For example, America’s active support
of a serious peace effort to solve the country’s dispute
over Indian-controlled Kashmir
might take away the raison d’être of some of
Pakistan’s
fundamentalist terrorist groups.
It is in the national security interest of the United
States to help turn Pakistan into something resembling a
representative secular society. For example,
Washington
could invest in
Pakistan’s public
education system so as to provide an alternative to the
madrasas that many of Pakistan’s poor end up
attending for lack of alternatives. Also, the United
States should take the lead in providing tangible
economic incentives for Musharraf to loosen restrictions
on moderate political parties while allowing him to
crack down on those Islamist groups that publicly
advocate terrorism.
The problem is that Musharraf has been unwilling to
loosen his grip on power. During the 2002 parliamentary
elections, for example, Musharraf did everything he
could to weaken the power of the more secular Pakistan
People’s Party (PPP) led by Benazir Bhutto. By
undermining those parties but not the fundamentalist
ones, he strengthened the latter grouping’s standing in
parliament to the point where he must rely increasingly
on their support to stay in power. This, of course,
makes it difficult for Musharraf to crack down on
radical Islamists. Although the Bush Administration
keeps insisting that it needs to work with Musharraf
because the alternatives would be worse, it cannot mean
that, in the age of “a balance of power that favors
freedom”, the United States has uncritically tolerate
Musharraf’s increasingly authoritarian traits.
Washington needs to ensure that Pakistan is being put
back on a more democratic political path. This will
vastly increase the chances that his successor will be
more to America’s liking. Indeed, this country’s stake
in the future development of Pakistan is enormously
high. Washington is well-advised to make the creation of
a stable and moderate Pakistani government with tight
control over its nuclear installations and scientists a
top-priority. The consequences of failure are
cataclysmic. As former Senator Sam Nunn wrote in the
Washington Post in October 2001, “[today] we find
ourselves in a new arms race. Terrorists are racing to
get weapons of mass destruction; we ought to be racing
to stop them.” Failure is not an option.
Sara Kupfer is a
free-lance journalist based in Washington, DC.
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