|
Global Parallels: Proportionate
Governance for Increased Commerce
Stephen Boyko
The economy functions
in the same way the video image and soundtrack combine
to form a movie. That is to say, a financial sector
paper product supports every good and service produced
in the real sector of the economy. This article is a
financial sector complement to Ian Campbell’s work
published in the 2004 Spring issue of The National
Interest entitled “Retreat from Globalization.”
In the
process of analyzing American trade policy, Campbell
states “unsustainable bubbles in asset prices have
become the mainstay of U.S. policymaking.” Market
bubbles are price distortions resulting from excess
liquidity. Market bubbles emanate from two basic
sources: one, a tsunami of paper currency overflowing
hard assets resulting from either bad fiscal and/or
monetary policy; or two, the financial equivalent of
pate de foie gras resulting from bad regulatory
policy that immobilizes the flow of capital.
I
maintain that excessive
and overly complex regulations designed for top-tier
NYSE and NASDAQ issues create a regulatory divide that
constrains commerce for both domestic and global
small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs). While the bull
market at the end of the twentieth century witnessed the
globalization of capital markets, much of the wealth
creation was confined primarily to the top-tier U.S.
markets. This, in part, was due to the absence of a
proportionate regulatory regime to govern the micro-cap
market.
The core difficulty
facing SMEs in pursuit of developmental equity financing
is not investor indisposition, but a fundamental failure
of one-size-fits-all securities regulations to adapt to
modern market realities. Markets correct more quickly
than regulators. Current regulatory convention
differentiates SMEs from large-cap issues solely in
terms of scale. This simplistic view poses a danger to
the historic foundation responsible for the growth of
the US economy. Excessive regulatory commands result in
a misallocation of capital that rations local business
investment opportunities and frustrates economic
development.
An analysis of
capital market standards illustrate how disproportionate
regulation has immobilized the flow of capital to the
micro-cap market and commercially censored SMEs.
Standards are prospective manifestations of societal
aspirations that prescribe commercial effectiveness
relative to providing a particular product or service.
The FLITE Model depicts capital market standards in
terms of fairness, liquidity, integration, transparency
and efficiency.
Fairness ensures that
investors, issuers and intermediaries conduct their
market activities in accordance with high standards of
commercial honor, and just and equitable principles of
fair trade. Fairness exists when the consummation of the
transaction depends exclusively on the terms of the
trade. However, one-size-fits-all regulation unfairly
discriminates against SME issuers by conflating risk and
uncertainty.
There are two generic
categories of equity securities: event-driven stocks
that are "sold" and earnings-driven stocks that are
"bought." The existing regulatory regime places a
disproportionate focus on financial capacity relative to
financial capability that is biased towards positive
cash flow, top-tier stocks that are “bought”. Top-tier
governance measures "risk" in an actuarial sense for
stocks that are "bought" based on cash flow predictions
from financial statements. This compares to SME
governance that reduces "uncertainty" relative to a lack
of measurable knowledge for stocks that are "sold."
Until an SME realizes its critical corporate event that
enables the enterprise to generate consistent positive
cash flow, reduction of uncertainty is the best that
investment research can provide. Yet top-tier
regulation, such as Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), requires SME
issuers to forecast uncertain future events as though
they were predictable[1].
Liquidity ensures
sufficient buyers and sellers exist to consummate
transactions at prices that are reasonably related to
quoted market prices. Liquidity is a function of time,
volatility, depth, breadth and resiliency of the market
place. Recent history has witnessed a decline in
micro-cap market liquidity. Entrepreneurial financing
defined as a percentage of total capital formation
decreased from 16.7 percent to 10.5 percent between 2000
and 2002. Concurrently, going-private filings rose from
197 to 316. Mergerstat reported that going-private deals
comprised 17 percent of all public takeovers in 2002[2].
If securitization, as former Citicorp Chairman Walter
Wriston stated, is the height of capital market
efficiency, what does “going private” indicate?
Integration enables
capital to flow unencumbered to and from global market
places in pursuit of investment opportunities.
Slower-than-expected development of emerging markets is
attributable, in part, to a misperception of the Former
Soviet Union’s (FSU) governance structure for the state
controlled the factors of production. “Soviet Inc.,” was
an unprofitable firm, not an inefficient market.
Employing market protocols of regulation and
infrastructure to remedy firm maladies added complexity
to the preexisting Byzantine structure. New financial
shopping malls were built in the FSU with few products
to put on the shelf. The misdiagnosis of the initial
condition created false constructs and unintended
consequences for the integration of global capital
markets[3].
Joseph Stiglitz[4]
argues:
“the failures of the
reforms in Russia and most of the former Soviet Union
are not just due to sound policies being poorly
implemented … the failures go deeper, to a
misunderstanding of the foundations of a market economy
as well as a misunderstanding of the basics of an
institutional reform process. Reform models based on
conventional neoclassical economics are likely to
under-estimate the importance of informational problems,
including those arising from the problems of corporate
governance; of social and organizational capital; and of
the institutional and legal infrastructure required to
make an effective market economy. They are also likely
to underestimate the importance of the creation of new
enterprises and the difficulties of doing so.”
Disproportionate
regulation not only immobilizes the flow of capital to
redline SME development, but it also constrains market
functions from driving existing assets to their highest
and best use.
Transparency refers
to dissemination of information about issuers. Accurate
and timely information increases valuation multiples and
liquidity of the market. Strategic transparency
decisions in financial markets are determined to a large
extent by the dominant investor[5].
In general, bank-controlled, debt-driven firms prefer
less information attendant to stock market trading. This
tends to protect firms in a weak competitive position.
Conversely, equity shareholders prefer more disclosure
to promote the strategic advantage of firms in a strong
competitive position. America is predisposed to
investment banking and equity-driven markets, whereas
Europe is predisposed to commercial banking and
debt-driven markets. The differences between accounting
policy and procedures can best be illustrated by the $1
billion revision to earnings that Mercedes Benz
experienced when it applied for listing on the New York
Stock Exchange.
Efficiency measures
the time, effort and cost required for changing property
rights for the owners of securities. The lack of
acceptance for Small Corporate Offering Registrations (SCOR)
illustrates regulatory driven cost-inefficiency. Most
state regulators required issuers to provide three years
of audited financial statements. This regulatory
requirement created an expensive hurdle that many
cash-strapped SCOR issuers could not afford. Also,
issuers that complied with the requirement soon
discovered that their universe of investors did not
consider three years of audited statements relevant to
understanding the company’s future milestones. The lack
of access to the next level of funding due to
incompatible SEC requirements caused capital rationing
problems for potential SCOR companies[6].
Conflicted capital
market standards render the micro-cap market ineffective
insofar as it is not able to provide the scalable
“sliver of equity” that SMEs require. Commercial
censorship constrains SME development and diverts excess
capital to create market bubbles. Financial fungibility
requires that the capital market be analyzed from a
systemic perspective. Changing one element of the
capital market system alters the analytical metrics for
the entire market; or, as proponents of Chaos Theory are
fond of noting, “that a butterfly fluttering its wings
in China can create a tornado in Kansas”.
An inefficient
financial scoring system alters market realities.
Capital that normally would have been allocated to fund
SMEs was diverted to the housing mortgage market. The
burden of disproportionate regulation that redlined SME
development was ultimately borne by the labor market as
measured in terms of outsource related unemployment.
SMEs are the primary engine of job creation. The Small
Business Administration (SBA) reports that SMEs generate
more than half of net new jobs. Recent history
demonstrated that tax reforms alone are insufficient to
generate the desired job growth because they only
marginally benefit SMEs[7].
For robust economic growth to take place in this
important sector, tax relief must be accompanied with
regulatory reform[8].
So what is the
required regulatory reform? Given the difficulties
associated with governing “sold” micro-cap issues using
top-tier “bought” securities regulation, I argue that at
some level of scale “risk” changes into “uncertainty”
requiring capital market governance to be divided into
three separate regulatory regimes to mobilize capital
for:
·
Government securities that trade in virtual-equilibrium
conditions and are bought for savings accounts;
·
Top-tier issues that trade in near-equilibrium
conditions and are bought for investment accounts, and
·
Micro-cap SME stocks that trade in far-from-equilibrium
conditions and are sold to venture accounts.
To this purpose, the
Entrepreneurial Exchange (EntEx)[9]
is proposed to reduce the cost of being a public company
by substituting investor intellectual capital for
financial capital. EntEx’s regulatory regime creates a
niche market for sophisticated investors where
compliance costs are priced more efficiently at the
margin for only those services needed. EntEx provides
scalable sponsorship and proportionate governance for
the global economic development of innovative financial
products and services.
Stephen A. Boyko is
president of Global Market Thoughtware, Inc., an
international consulting company that specializes in
economic governance issues.
[4]
Stiglitz, J.E., 1999, Whither Reform? World Bank.
|