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Iraq's Regional Echoes
Ximena Ortiz
Realities in Iraq have limited the administration's
once-expansive menu for justifying the war. Still on its
list is the potential for Iraq to send democratic
shockwaves through the Middle East.
President Bush has repeatedly invoked that prospect
lately. But, like an incantation gone awry, Iraq is
indeed transmitting shockwaves - but not the democratic
kind.
Iraq has
become an exporter of ethnic violence. And it is Turkey,
a critical democracy in the region, that has been most
affected. The troubles are also recoiling back on
Iraq itself. Given
this backdrop, Bush seems strangely detached from
grounded realities as he carefully enunciates scripted
platitudes regarding Iraq's regional impact.
The toppling of Saddam Hussein brought Iraqi Kurds the
defeat of a tormentor, but also the end of a U.S.-led
no-fly zone that had guaranteed sovereignty from 1991 to
2003. Uncertainty about Iraqi Kurdistan's future has
prompted some Kurds to take up arms to defend it,
emboldened by memories of persecution.
Turkey has been hit by Kurdish militancy, due in part to
perceptions that it is working against Kurdish
interests. Turkey has tried to rein in the autonomy of
Iraq's Kurdistan, out of concern it would reawaken the
secessionist ambitions of Turkish Kurds. Those efforts
have put a new strain on Turkish-Kurdish relations, said
Gulsun Bilgehan, a lawmaker with Turkey's Republican
People's Party.
Kurdish political leaders are committed to talking
through that diplomatic impasse, but other Kurds have
taken up arms.
Turkey had been at peace with Turkish-Kurdish militants
since 1999, when PKK insurgents called a unilateral
cease-fire. Last month, the PKK called an end to that
truce. Terrorism has followed.
Turkish police said the PKK is believed responsible for
an attack targeting a governor in eastern Turkey earlier
this month. Turkish forces have also clashed with the
PKK along, and possibly beyond, the border with Iraq.
Thousands of PKK militants are believed to be hiding in
northern Iraq, virtually unchallenged by coalition or
Iraqi forces.
This is a shame, because Turkey needs a good
relationship with the Kurds to maintain stability and
continue its democratic evolution. And Kurdish militancy
could undermine Turkey's bid to enter the European Union
-- a prospect that could bridge Muslim and Christian
worlds.
With so much at stake, Turkey has bolstered ties with
Syria and Iran to discuss collective concerns over the
Kurds. Syria and Iran also have sizeable Kurdish
populations that the governments have clashed with since
the war.
Turkey's
strengthened ties with Syria and Iran - two countries it
has traditionally had chilly relations with - could harm
its traditional alliance with the United States.
Turkey's newly
distressed relationship with Israel, meanwhile, could
also have a Kurdish dimension. In a June article in
The New Yorker magazine, Seymour Hersh alleged
Israeli forces were training Kurdish militias in
northern Iraq. That report, which Israeli officials
deny, would seriously alarm
Turkey’s
leaders if it were accurate.
Syria and
Iran
have apparently been bolstering other Iraqi militias to
counterweigh the strength of the Kurdish militia and to
tie up U.S.
forces. Iran is allegedly helping Moqtada al Sadr, while
Syria could be aiding former Ba'athist elements.
The jockeying for militia proxies in Iraq is now a part
of regional dynamics. It is causing a build up of arms
that threaten coalition forces in Iraq, not to mention
sectarian brinkmanship that will make it more difficult
for Iraqi groups to strike a necessary power-sharing
agreement. But things could get much worse.
"If Iraq becomes divided, what we see is that first
Iraqis themselves will become involved in clashes ...
and then neighboring countries will not stay away," said
Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul in an interview in Ankara.
Should Iraqis start fighting each other and foreign
forces march into Iraq, U.S. forces could confront them
(including allied Turkish forces), and foreign forces
could even fight each other.
That dire prospect should shock-and-awe
U.S.
officials into action. A military response to concerns
about foreign support of militias is not realistic,
given stretched
U.S. forces. The
administration might have little choice but to negotiate
with countries in region.
In crafting its Middle East policy, including its broad
democracy-spreading agenda, the administration must
recognize (to itself) that the Iraq campaign has
weakened U.S. leverage in the Middle East, since foreign
governments have new opportunities to undermine
U.S.
interests through subterfuge in
Iraq.
Call that collateral damage.
Ximena Ortiz is the
2003-2004 recipient of the Pulliam Editorial Fellowship.
She is writing the book, "The War, According to the
World." A version of this piece appeared in UPI's
"Outside View." |