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The Realist
A Different
Failure of Intelligence
Nikolas K. Gvosdev
Pundits continue to debate the question of "intelligence
failure" as it relates to the terrorist attacks of 9/11
and the existence of weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq.
But an intelligence failure of a different sort has not
received a great deal of attention. This concerns global
energy markets. With the oil price now hovering around
$47 per barrel – more than $20 higher than even the
acceptable price band laid down by OPEC – the question
must be posed: was this outcome foreseeable?
This is a different point than saying it was
foreordained. But the job of economic analysts and
policymakers is to be prepared for all eventualities.
In The National Interest's winter 2003/04 energy
supplement, I myself noted some trends that suggested
rising global demand:
“China is buying up more oil on the world markets –
imports for 2003 are up by 30 percent from last year,
and imports as a whole are expected to double ... by
2010. ... While China has seen its rate of oil
consumption skyrocket over the last decade (by 109
percent), it is not the only hungry consumer. During the
same period South Korea's usage increased by 78 percent.
By 2010, India is expected to be the world's fourth
largest consumer of oil” (www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol2Issue49/Vol2Issue49Energy-Gvosdev.html).
And consider this warning, from
February 12, 2003,
from Dr. Charles Kohlhaas, prior to the Iraq war:
“Oil
inventories are at record low levels. OPEC has admitted
its surplus capacity is down to about 2 to 4 percent of
world demand levels and it cannot make up for supply
shortages caused by a disruption of Iraqi production in
addition to the Venezuelan shutdown. Non-OPEC producers
are already producing at capacity. Even if we squeeze
through these near-term shortages, the surplus
capacity will disappear in less than 3 years with
normal demand growth in recovering economies causing
long-term upward pressure on oil prices which will
stifle that same growth” (emphasis added by ITNI,
www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/vol2issue6/vol2issue6kohlhaaspfv.html).
And we
know that not only has normal demand, particularly in
East Asia, been on the rise, but that China and India,
in particular, are also purchasing oil for their own
stockpiles and reserves.
There
should have been a reasonable expectation, therefore,
that supplies would be tight and this would lead to
price increases. Moreover, why would Saudi Arabia and
other oil producers be expected to take actions to lower
their incomes from increased revenues? Consider what
Robin West said at the October 4, 2001 symposium that
formed the basis of the special issue of The National
Interest ("The Terror"):
“We
estimate that the break-even point for Saudi Arabia ...
to run the country, which is 90 percent dependent on oil
revenues – is about $21 a barrel ... we may no longer be
right to assume that any Saudi regime would feel obliged
to sell a lot of oil.”
In
other words, Saudi interests – the interests of the
world's largest oil exporter – may not coincide with
U.S.
interests – the world's largest importer. So to assume
that Saudi Arabia will "pull our chestnuts out of the
fire" out of the goodness of its heart is folly. Saudi
Arabia may have an interest in preventing the oil price
from going so high that importing nations cannot afford
to purchase large amounts of oil and move to rationing –
but there is no reason to believe that they would want
the oil price to artificially fall to the mid-$20 range
if they can reasonably expect importers to pay a price
of $40 per barrel.
All of
this could have been anticipated. And it raises the
question of what the purpose of the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve is. If, three years ago, one noted that oil
prices would be over $45 per barrel, I think nearly
every expert would have said this would have qualified
as the proverbial "rainy day" for which the reserve was
created – and begun to move more oil out to market.
But
even this is a short-term solution. Even if prices drop
to some extent in the months ahead, it is unlikely that
the halcyon days of oil at $16 per barrel are anywhere
in sight. Now, more than ever, a concerted, credible and
serious energy strategy is needed.
This is
our wake-up call. Time to go to work.
Nikolas
K. Gvosdev is editor of In the National Interest.
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