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Romania's
Black Sea Agenda -- and America's Interests
The Honorable
Mircea Dan Geoana
Why has Romania taken such an interest in the Black Sea
at a time when so many of our partners seem more
concerned with the Middle East or the Balkans?
After 9/11, there was an embryonic debate about where
the regional priorities of the West lay. This soon
became a major strategic shift, as the areas of interest
and opportunity have broadened past Central and Eastern
Europe and the Middle East to the “arc of instability”
which reaches from Palestine through Iraq, the Caucasus,
and into Central Asia. In particular, the region around
the Black Sea has been, and should be, attracting
interest now--given its strategic location.
Why is this region important to Western policymakers?
The first and most apparent reason is advancing
democracy and consolidating stability in the broader
Black sea region. Over the last decade, the
Euro-Atlantic community has vastly expanded eastward:
with three littoral countries as NATO members, and the
expansion of EU to encompass Romania and Bulgaria in
2007 (and hopefully with Turkey soon to come), Western
institutions and values reach the shores of the Black
Sea. But the process should not stop there. The new
historical circumstances, as well as the experience of
successful democratic transformations in Eastern Europe
demand all of us to reevaluate, thoroughly and wisely,
the way we approach this region.
Second is the geostrategic significance of the
Black Sea/Caucasus/greater Middle East region to Western
governments. This should first be recognized by
Brussels. The Southern Caucasus must be added into the
“Wider European Neighborhood” policy from which the
European Commission has so long excluded it. Voices
from important European capitals indicate that this will
soon happen. Once recognized, the issues upon which
progress can be best made through international
cooperation should be addressed: cross-border smuggling
(of people, goods, and weapons); transnational organized
crime; and, most important to our American friends,
stemming the proliferation of WMD and their components
and fighting terrorism. Such cooperation is indeed
possible, as evidenced by the success of the SECI
(Southeast European Cooperative Initiative) Regional
Center for Combating Transborder Crime, headquartered in
Bucharest. This initiative may serve as a model for a
virtual GUUAM Center in the Caucasus region, located in
Baku.
Third is energy. We know that the European Union
has traditionally supported a northerly route, along the
axis Berlin-Warsaw-Moscow, while the United States has
pushed for a southerly path across Turkey to the
Mediterranean. We desire a “middle corridor” across the
Black Sea, Romania, and the Balkans, a corridor not only
for energy, but for trade and business of all kinds.
While I recognize the limitations of full free trade
agreements among countries which have differing
relationships with the European Union, I want to make
clear my support for regional cooperation on energy; the
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), of which we are
an enthusiastic part, is relatively under-utilized on
this issue.
Forth, is its significance to Western relations with
Russia.
Despite the continuing discussion of the problem areas
of Abkhazia and Transdnistria, there is a need to
convince Russia that its traditional logic of
maintaining a military presence – the logic of
Kaliningrad – is an obsolete technique. We need to
convince them that zero-sum logic politics don’t apply
here, especially in countries which have suffered for so
long from being caught in between powers playing the
great game of empire. In sum, we need to use the NATO
summit in Istanbul later this year to re-engage our
Russian friends, to tell them that we have a common
interest in the Black Sea, in the Caucasus, in Central
Asia, in securing our common backyard as we focus on the
great multi-generational project of modernizing the
“greater Middle East.”
What should be the new approach?
For the next sequential stage an efficient coordination
of policies and positions of wider democratic
community’s members is required towards the Black Sea
region. As we are brought more fully into the
Euro-Atlantic Community, therefore, we, especially in
the "new" West, see the need to replicate the effort
that was made first in Central Europe and then in
southeast Europe in the lands across the Black Sea into
Central Asia. We have the obligation to encourage
change in these societies. Last year’s history in the
Caucasus countries clearly confirms that we can work on
an encouraging ground to uphold democracy in the area.
The case of Georgia speaks for itself.
In the West's relations with the Caucasus, we, in
Romania, want to be a springboard and not a barricade.
And here, I think, that Romania will be in a position to
positively influence developments in this region,
expanding the zone of peace and prosperity from the
Atlantic eastward across the continent.
In our vision, we see three critical directions for an
action plan towards this goal. Firstly, we need to
concentrate on the security and military issues by
supporting the strengthening of the respective
countries’ national institutions to respond to
twenty-first century challenges and to become more
interoperable with the European and Euro-Atlantic
institutions. Secondly, our attention must focus on
further enhancing economic ties with the Western markets
and enforcing the east-west corridors. These corridors
have endless promise, and can indeed reach all the way
to China, across the lands where the real
tectonic plates of the world are - where the confluence
of Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism is found. The last
but not the least, we believe that further efforts to
consolidate a strong and vibrant civil society in the
countries from the Black Sea area remains instrumental
to reaffirm the value of citizen participation in the
democratic process and to reinforce a key set of
institutions that lie at the nexus of state and society.
Mircea Dan Geoana is
Foreign Minister of Romania.
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