Turkish Bravado versus American Bullying:
A Clash of Civilizations?
March
12, 2003
By Zeyno Baran
The Turkish
Parliament was supposed to vote "yes" on March 1 to a resolution
allowing the basing of 62,000 American troops and 320 aircraft. After all,
the Army’s 4th Infantry Division had been waiting for several
days in ships offshore for permission to unload tanks and other equipment.
The vote was four short, and the next vote is not likely to take place
until after the war starts. This
would exclude Turkey from taking part in the creation of the main war
plans. After months of negotiations between the so-called strategic
allies, the failure to get a yes from Turkey is a serious failure for U.S.
policy.
Throughout the
negotiations the American side did not have a hint of the “humility in foreign policy” George W. Bush had
promised as a presidential candidate. The Turks kept saying that they
would not be able to vote yes until a second UN resolution passed, or at
least when the U.S. made clear it would go to war, but the U.S. was too
focused on the end-game to listen and understand the political dynamics in
Turkey. The worldviews and the motives of the two governments were so far
apart that one could talk about a "clash of civilizations" that
inevitably led to a "dialogue of the deaf."
In fact, the
majority of Turks are proud that their parliament stood tough against
American pressure and joined the set of countries opposing a war that few
see as necessary at this point. Senior Turkish government representatives
even believed that delaying a "northern attack option" for Iraq
would deter President Bush from launching a war against Iraq. Many even
believed that the Bush Administration was behind Turkey’s humiliation in
the media, and were especially insulted at a cartoon portraying Turkey as
a prostitute for bargaining hard on the economic assistance package. The
parliament may have stood up for the Turkish honor, but it was more like
“burning the whole blanket for a flea in it,” a proverb whose American
equivalent would be “throwing out the baby with the bathwater.”
While the main
focus seemed to be on the size of the economic package, the big questions
remained unanswered. In the absence of effective dialogue, the process
took over. The Turks put on a tough bargain on economic, political and
military issues to address their key concerns as they had outlined (this
was discussed in my earlier piece in In
the National Interest, "Turkey's Difficult Balancing Act,"
at http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol2Issue4/Vol2Issue4Baran.html
). The U.S. side thought that
the negotiations had ended several weeks ago when the Turkish Foreign and
Economic Ministers met with President Bush at the White House. For the
Turks, however, all three sets of issues need more fine-tuning due to
perceived historic injustices and mistrust towards the United States. If
the Turkish game-plan was to delay a yes vote as long as possible,
however, the Turks believed that there was no reason to believe the talks
would come to a end before the start of the war.
The tragedy for
Turkey is that it would likely say yes to the U.S. after the war starts,
as it did in the Gulf War, but that would be too late to receive the
enormous economic assistance package the United States was willing to
offer as a result of “full cooperation.”
The final U.S. offer to Turkey was a generous grant of $6 billion,
up from $4 billion. Turkey would be able to turn $2 billion of that grant
into U.S.-backed loans, which could mean, in real terms, about $17 billion
in aid. There would be $2 billion for military assistance. With the
establishment of a Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ), which would include
textiles, and with other defense related procurement, Turkey would get at
least an additional $1 billion. Turkish companies would get post-war
reconstruction contracts. Moreover, to assuage Turkish concerns of ethnic
lobby groups trying to block the package in Congress, the Bush
Administration promised an immediate loan of over $10 billion. This money
would not only help Turkey with immediate economic impacts of the war, but
also help it roll over its huge debt, which is about 90% of its gross
national product.
Administration
officials referred to this package as an “unprecedented mini-Marshall
plan,” but it was not enough for Turkey. Coming down from an initial
request of $92 billion, Turks wanted $10 billion in grants. They also
strongly objected to conditions that the aid be tied to the $31 billion
IMF economic reform program. The American side rightly held tight on the
IMF linkage: The program is on hold for over four months due to
non-performance and Turkish macro economic picture has been grim for many
years. On top of that, the new Turkish government has made populist
promises, and to a large degree had hoped to fund these promises from a
large U.S. assistance package in case of war.
If Turkey does not
say yes in time to the U.S. (for troop basing and over-flight rights), all
these negotiations would be for nil. The U.S. would be too focused on the
war to renegotiate a smaller assistance package for Turkey. Given the
growing negative sentiments in the Congress about Turkey, the Bush
Administration would have a much harder time, assuming it would still want
to use up political capital for Turkey. Turkish markets have not reacted
negatively so far because there is still optimism that at the last minute
there would be an agreement. As soon as the reality sinks in, confidence
would disappear and Turkey could be on its way to become another
Argentina. Such a development would benefit the radical Islamist elements
in Turkey who would blame the U.S. for the economic and social troubles.
This then might force the military to step in to restore order and prevent
further Islamization of politics.
Even if there were
full agreement on the economic package, Turks would still insist on
finalizing the political negotiations, which deals mainly with an
agreement on post-Saddam Iraq. They want clear guarantees that the Turkmen
would have a fair share in any future Iraqi government.
This is a critical issue, a point I have stressed at several points
in this publication (see my above-referenced piece, at http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol2Issue4/Vol2Issue4Baran.html,
and at http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol1Issue14/Vol1Issue4Symposium.html).
A day before the March 1 parliamentary vote, however, Iraqi opposition
groups met in Northern Iraq and selected six leaders, which did not
include any from among the Turkmen. What made it worse is that U.S.
Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad was present at the meeting. Turks then felt
vindicated in their fear that that their ethnic brothers and their
interests in post-Saddam Iraq would be overlooked by the Kurds and Arabs
and the U.S. would not stand up for Turkish concerns. (This was one of the
factors behind the no vote in the parliament the next day.)
In private
discussions last week in Ankara and Istanbul, several people mentioned
their belief that the United States, in fact, has been playing the Kurds
and the Turks against each other to get its "northern front."
Some even wondered if the burning of the Turkish flags in Erbil, in
territory controlled by the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) was backed by
some in the U.S. or the UK. They noted U.S. opinion pieces arguing for
"dropping" Turkey and "adopting" the Kurds—without
keeping in mind that one is a country and supposedly a long-time strategic
NATO ally and the other an ethnic group. Calls by some Iraqi Kurdish
groups to unite against Turkey and cause problems for Turkey in the event
of war have further touched raw nerves in Ankara.
While Barham Salih
of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has repeatedly said that
Turkey's secular democracy is a model for the Iraqi Kurds and that they
would not seek a separate Kurdish state, many others do not share his
vision. A majority of the Kurds want a federal state in Iraq to pave the
way for eventual Kurdish independence, which would inevitably lead to
separatist tendencies and terrorism in Turkish territory as well.
Moreover, declared Turkish policy states that the formation of a Kurdish
state in Northern Iraq would be reason to go to war.
In this context, if
Washington and Ankara fail to reach an agreement, there is also a danger
of U.S. and Turkish militaries facing each other in Northern Iraq. The
Turkish government has made unequivocally clear that with or without the
U.S. they would go to Northern Iraq, initially for humanitarian reasons,
but also to keep an eye on the Kurds. It would not be a surprise is they
also target some terrorist elements. In the heat of war, however, it may
not be so clear who is a terrorist. The State Department's Undersecretary
for Political Affairs Marc Grossman has repeatedly warned Turkey not to
take unilateral action, as the Kurds would then definitely be provoked
into taking arms against the Turks. To avoid a massacre, the U.S. military
would have to face its Turkish counterparts, which could not lead to
anything good.
Where do we go from
here? First, Turkey will need several days to form the new government
under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of the governing Justice and
Development Party (AKP), who is assuming the prime ministership. (He was
banned from running in the November 2002 general elections because of a
conviction for inciting religious hatred. Following a constitutional
amendment, he won a parliamentary seat in by-elections on March 9 and
sworn in as a member of parliament on March 11.) The vote of confidence
for the new government is not likely to take place for about a week, and
the second resolution then cannot be brought to the parliament until March
19th at the earliest.
Erdogan has
enormous bravado, believing he can take on the U.S., if need be. He made
it clear in an over three hour meeting with U.S. Ambassador Robert Pearson
on March 9 and on a phone conversation with President Bush on March 10
that he would not bring the second vote to the parliament before the UN
decision on March 17, and not before the future of Iraq and the status of
the Turkmen are finalized. According to White House leaks to the media,
Bush was rather unhappy with the call, and the war machinery moved to the
so-called “Plan B.” Turks, however, believe the call was appropriate
and the United States would wait for the second Turkish vote—after all,
there were so many other “deadlines” which passed without the United
States making a move. Indeed, the latest British efforts to set up
"benchmarks" for Saddam Hussein support the Turkish view that no
deadline that Washington insists upon is truly final or binding.
Due to a “clash
of civilizations,” or at least of political perceptions, the Turks
simply will not believe time is up until it really is, and therefore
believe that the U.S. should stop hoping for a yes vote before the war.
However, there has to be a way for Turkey to come in after the start of
the war.
Without Turkey the
U.S. could still wage a successful war in Iraq, but it would be longer and
costlier. Moreover, Turkish cooperation would be important in maintaining
stability in Iraq following the war. Above all, losing Muslim Turkey while
the war against terrorism is still a top priority would allow the United
States to be cast throughout the Muslim world in the mold of
“crusaders.”
For its part,
Turkey will certainly pay for its leadership's inexperience by at least a
decade of political and economic instability. Turkey’s EU hopes would be
further shattered following the entry of Turkish soldiers into Northern
Iraq, as a German governing party member indicated to me at a meeting last
week. The AKP party is unfortunately reverting back to its core Islamist
elements and such negative developments would speed up this process.
As a result of the
parliamentary vote, both sides will pay a price.
Zeyno Baran is
the Director for International Security and Energy Programs at The Nixon
Center (http://www.nixoncenter.org).