In the Shadow of the Bush Ultimatum: The View from France 

An interview with Philippe Raynaud 

(Conducted by Damjan de Krnjevic-Miskovic, assistant managing editor of The National Interest) 

Q: Professor, there seem to me to be three critical topics for France arising from President Bush’s speech on Monday night. First, could we have your opinion of the speech?  Then could you assess its impact on the development of French opinion?  Finally, could you discuss the consequences for the Franco-American relationship? First, your reaction to the president's address.  

A: This was a good speech, much better than those that preceded it in the sense that Bush employed arguments that were quite concentrated.

Q: Could you give an example? 

A: From the point of view of international law, for example, making the explicit link to UN Security Council Resolutions 678 and 687 is important. To follow President Bush’s reasoning: he is not engaging in war, or at least not a new war, since the Gulf War was never over. These resolutions provided for a cease-fire, and there were provisions for immediate disarmament then, in 1991, that were not respected, obviously. President Bush’s interpretation of international law is that the sanction of the Security Council is not indispensable given that the it has already been given more than once over a period extending back twelve years. It also signifies that any state given the conditions currently at play, i.e. the fact that there is a cease-fire, has the right to do what is necessary to defend itself. 

This brings us back to the classical conception of international law, namely the one that reigned prior to the establishment of the United Nations. The meaning of this speech is that the United States has a sovereign right—as a state that particularly feels its sovereignty, given its power and its moral authority—to act. This is the context in which we should see the doctrine of pre-emption. 

The doctrine of pre-emption, of course, is not in keeping with the style adopted since 1991. European reactions to this novel doctrine, to the present crisis and to the war that will come are fundamentally different from those to previous post-1991 conflicts (in which Europeans participated in not insignificant numbers): in 1990–1 there was the attempt to annex another sovereign state, in the Afghan affair there was the American-led response to an act of aggression universally sanctioned by the Security Council and NATO, etc. All this meant that in previous situations, opinion was more spontaneously favorable than in this case, where the perception of the danger, as Bush himself said, is certainly not the same in the U.S. and in Europe. So the speech was a good speech in the service of the cause that President Bush is defending. I note also that there is the promise of creating a war crimes tribunal, which might be a way to reaffirm the American doctrine of ad hoc tribunals. The speech, then, said much in few words.

Q:  In the immediate, short-term aftermath of the speech and its ultimatum, what will France do? How will French opinion develop? 

A: This depends of course on the flow of events. The situation in France is different from the way it is presented in America’s conservative press. In a diplomatic crisis, there are subtexts that are lost on some and therefore not taken into account. The French position is not one of principled pacifism. Rather, it is that the time for war had not yet arrived because diplomatic ways had not been exhausted. Both President Chirac and Foreign Minister De Villepin have said that this is a unilateral act, that it is a great assumption of responsibility, etc. The tone was one of misapprobation. That being said, two things need to be noted in the recent speeches by Chirac. 

First, a few days ago on French television, he said clearly that France authorizes American use of its airspace. Secondly, he said on American television, if I remember correctly, that he hoped that the victory will be swift. So the French position is not as belligerent as is commonly understood. Given the end of the diplomatic phase of the conflict, France will not impede the United States. More than that, it will show certain signs of goodwill, since that which France has permitted is still being negotiated between America and her Turkish ally, it seems to me.

Q: But not exactly, since with the Turks it was also a question of staging troops, of opening up a second front in the land war—if it comes to that.  

A: Certainly, but what I mean to say is that in contradistinction to the ongoing Turkish situation, the French move did not require negotiations of any sort. France has given signals of bienveillance, that is, France, now, is not looking to impede the American intervention, given that the time for diplomacy has passed.

Q: Fine. Please explain the worldview informing the French attitude toward America’s behavior in the international arena.  

A: The French position, with all its complexities, is predicated on three things. I will present them in ascending order of importance or seriousness.  

First, the argument that the United States does not have sufficient authority to pursue its ambitions in the Middle East because it is too pro-Israel. This is a weak argument because one can say easily of France and the European Union that they are too pro-Palestinian. Also, the Europeans don’t have the means to act in the region, or at least their means are quite inefficient. So this argument is a weak argument.  

Second, a more forceful explanation of the French attitude concerns a differing evaluation of the likelihood and risks involved in the attempt to transform the Middle East in the wake of a successful  war. I find the American plan ambitious and risky. On the French side, there is a prudence that betrays too much caution.  

Third, the most important explanation comes down to a different philosophical conception of the international system. French diplomacy is not anti-American, but strongly anti-imperial. It is rooted in the understanding that a unipolar world, or a unipolar era, as Charles Krauthammer recently put it in your magazine, is impossible; and that it is imprudent to try. The most effective way to maintain more or less normal relations in the world is to proceed by management and resolution of conflicts by juridical-legal rather than military means. 

France does not believe that there will be a world led by a hegemonic power, even by a benevolent hegemonic power. Even Vedrine, who is seen in the darkest lights in the United States, does not have a hostility to the United States. He is someone who has a deep pessimism on the possibility of one power being able to master the whole of the diplomatic chess board. 

As the contemporary world no longer operates along Westphalian principles, one must seek to bring into being a regime of international law, that is, negotiation over force. This is the French position, and note that this philosophic divergence does not necessarily involve a conflict with Europe.

Q: Will French opinion will evolve? 

A: I think so. Those who occupy themselves with French policies toward America say, and I agree with them, that if the war ends quickly, which I think it will, and if the American troops are perceived as liberators by the Iraqis, as seems likely—at least at the beginning—France will see the campaign as an act of benevolence and as not quite as risky as some had thought. France’s decision to allow coalition aircraft to fly over its territory will encourage this shift in public opinion. France’s interest lies in ensuring that French opinion changes, or that the solidarity of the anti-war camp be broken. I hope that in the weeks to come, you will see the return of heterogeneity in French anti-war public opinion. Some will remain against for various reasons (far-Left, far-Right, professional pacifists) and others, those who were simply not convinced that President Bush had made the case, will shift. The point is that in a month, the 80% who were against the war will not translate into an 80% who will see the war as having been a catastrophe. 
 

Q: On the future of the Franco-American alliance. How will the trust be rebuilt? 

A: Here we have a problem. Many have made a mess of things. This crisis brought forth severe criticisms of the United States from those who had always been favorable to America and her policies. This is most obvious in French intellectual circles (think of Jean-Paul Julliard, Pierre Hassner, etc.), but true also in French political circles. 

It will also depend on the way the United States will interpret the story of this crisis, and what the talking heads as well as the government officials will say over the next little while. Informed French public opinion has had the impression that France was the object of excessive American histrionics (what comes out of FoxNews does end up being known in France). If you are committed to the Bush position and you present reasonable arguments like those of Kagan, then this is acceptable (Fine, Kagan posits a division of labor in the international system, with a not too glorious, pacifist, part for Europe, but nevertheless envisions continued partnership). 

But if American sentiment follows that expressed by Richard Perle, namely that France is no longer an ally, that France is dangerous because it seeks to balance against the United States, and that therefore one must seek to reduce its influence within the European Union, then relations will degrade. Certainly France will have to pay for its policies during the diplomatic phase of the conflict with Iraq, but it’s a question of degree. And this is important to remember. So greater rhetorical and conceptual prudence is required not just in Paris, but also in Washington.  

To conclude, I hope that both governments understand that divergences in opinion between allies are legitimate, and that this crisis can be considered alongside other recent Franco-American crises. For example, President Reagan had close ties with President Mitterand notwithstanding the fact that the French president engineered rather anti-American policies on more than a few occasions. Reagan understood that Mitterand would support him “when”, as you said in your recent article, “the chips were down, successive U.S. administrations believed that France could be counted among its closest allies.” 

Franco-American cooperation is mutually beneficial, especially in the context of the war on terrorism. To forget this is a grave danger. Lastly, Washington must understand that the French project for Europe, that, that Europe should become a power in the international system, is not a danger to America.  

Philippe Raynaud is a professor of political science at Université de Paris II (Panthénon-Assas) and a noted commentator on the Franco-American relationship.