Determination, Not Recrimination
March
19, 2003
By Dimitri K. Simes and Paul J. Saunders
On the eve of war
with Iraq, the time for debate and second-guessing has passed and the time
for supporting American troops—and their commander-in-chief—has
arrived. Whatever one’s
original views of inspections, diplomacy, and the Iraqi threat, after our
country’s massive military and political investment in victory over
Saddam Hussein—and in the face of the mounting costs and risks of
uncertainty to cooperative U.S. allies in the region, to British Prime
Minister Tony Blair’s political future, and to America’s “frozen”
economy—it is essential to recognize that President Bush is making the
right decision in going to war. Now
that hostilities appear imminent, all should hope for a quick victory with
minimal consequences for U.S. forces, Iraqi civilians, and America’s
image in the world.
No one should
feel guilty about acting without yet another United Nations Security
Council resolution. It is
important to remember that the vast majority of the wars that have taken
place during the almost sixty-year life span of the United Nations have
taken place without its formal authorization.
The Korean War and the 1991 Persian Gulf War are the exception
rather than the rule.
In fact, many of the interventions most frequently
described as “justified” have not been endorsed by the Security
Council. Interestingly,
France takes a fairly casual approach to the Security Council in its own
regular low-level military involvement in Africa.
Also, Paris did not particularly object to NATO’s 1999 air
campaign against Yugoslavia, which was not taken to the UN because of
concern over a likely Russian veto. The
Yugoslavia air campaign similarly belies arguments that an “imminent
threat” is necessary to justify an attack or that force should be
strictly a last resort. Belgrade
was not a threat to NATO and, as historical evidence now demonstrates, the
true atrocities occurred after the bombing began, not before.
And France was much less vigorous in asking for more time to work
out a deal with Slobodan Milosevic—who had no weapons of mass
destruction and had not sent military forces outside his country’s
borders—than it was in seeking to prolong UN inspections in Iraq.
Still, while eschewing guilt over the absent blessings of
the “international community,” the United States should also avoid
self-destructive recriminations against key allies and partners.
Though some of America’s long-time allies have not exactly
covered themselves with glory in dealing with Iraq, all are entitled to
their own opinions as both sovereign states and (in many but not all
cases) as democracies. It
would be not only hypocritical, but also unrealistic to demand blind
allegiance from U.S. allies—particularly in the face of widespread
opposition to American policy within their own political systems.
Also, while the Bush Administration was right not to be deterred by
the United Nations, taking into account that for decades the United States
has been the most frequent user of the veto privilege, Americans should
not be overly offended when others signal similar intentions. In acting without the United Nations, organizing a coalition
of the willing, and sending 300,000 troops into battle, Washington has
already made its point about U.S. power and determination. Rubbing our outrage in their faces would be counterproductive
and petty—and great empires cannot afford to look petty.
Fortunately, there have been some preliminary signals that
France and Russia do not want to take their disagreement with the United
States too far. France’s
Ambassador to the United Nations has said that Iraq’s use of weapons of
mass destruction would “change everything”; Russian Foreign Minister
Igor Ivanov said that he hoped that despite disagreements over Iraq, the
United Nations would play an important role in reconstructing the country.
While these statements sound self-serving, it is in the
American interest to explore them in order to preserve important
relationships with Paris and Moscow and to engage them and others in the
aftermath of the war. Occupying
Iraq largely alone, the United States would serve as a lightning rod for
criticism and retaliation; working with others, America is at less risk.
This is especially true in dealing with Arab public opinion and, no
less important, in securing Arab and other financial support for
rebuilding Iraq.
Victory is not the end of what must be done in Iraq. Nor is victory the end of the war on terrorism or the end of U.S. efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Under the circumstances, maintaining effective working relationships with other major powers that can help to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of U.S. intervention in Iraq should be a priority. Self-righteous indignation will only benefit Osama bin Laden and other U.S. enemies; it will not enhance American global leadership.