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After
Iraq
: Oil and Geopolitics
Charles
Kohlhaas
It is an understatement to say the aftermath of the war in
Iraq
is proving to be
a difficult period.
World media attention is focused on anti-American
demonstrations and the failure of the American military
to establish civil order.
Diplomats and commentators debate and opine on
how, and by whom, a stable government, an orderly social
system and a functioning economy should be established in Iraq; as well as what
actions the United States
will take regarding
other Middle Eastern countries and North Korea.
At this point, it is obvious the follow-up process will not be a smooth
one and the result will probably not be the orderly,
federal democratic system envisioned by the Bush
Administration—at least not until after a long period
of turmoil and conflict.
Oil fields and facilities were damaged much less
than was expected before the war.
A return of production to supply the domestic
Iraqi oil market may take only a few months.
A return to significant volumes of oil exports,
however, will need to overcome several political and
legal—as well as operational and
investment—obstacles.
As such, Iraq
may not realize its
potential as a source of large increased supplies of oil
to a growing world market for several years, if at all.
For several decades, the United States
, as a matter of its
own enlightened self-interest, has undertaken to
establish and maintain security of oil supply for all
the world’s economies.
Any serious consideration of energy or foreign
policy must recognize that now, and for the foreseeable
future, oil represents the life’s blood of the
international economic order. Despite the delusions of
anti-globalization protestors and street demonstrators,
the secure supply and low price of oil not only allow
wealthy countries to prosper but also define the margin
in poor countries as to whether people eat or go hungry,
have the medicines they need or send their children to
school.
The Iraq
affair highlighted a coincidental development in international
economics. Combined
with the strike in Venezuela
and political unrest
in
Nigeria
, it showed the
world’s discretionary surplus oil productive
capability is much less than had been previously
estimated. As
world economies resume normal growth with accompanying
increases in oil demand, the world is likely to be
faced, for the first time, with oil-supply shortages and
persistent upward pressure on prices over the next
several years.
Oil prices have declined since the end of the war due to the return of
Iraqi and Venezuelan production and a seasonal spring
demand slump, but this price drop should not induce a
false complacency regarding supplies.
A prolonged trend of increasing prices would
severely restrain economic recovery in the United States,
Europe
and Japan
.
Oil shortages would be particularly disruptive to stability in
Asia
, the area of fastest economic and oil demand growth.
Japan
is still in a
prolonged depression and barely avoiding financial
collapse.
China
has been an oil
importer since 1993, while India
has always been
dependent on imports. Both are rapidly industrializing.
China
continues to
modernize its military and is already laying claim to
large areas of the South China Sea
and its potential oil
and gas resources. The
need for oil supplies without American guarantees of
free access and stability will only increase China’s temptation to
solve its energy needs by force.
Since the U.S.
lost its Philippine
bases, piracy has become one of the fastest-growing
industries in Southeast Asia.
China
also borders Russia
and Central Asian
countries with large oil and gas resources and could
become belligerent about access to those supplies.
Indonesia, the only OPEC
producer in
Asia, has been disintegrating since the Bre-X gold mining fraud was exposed
in 1997. It is now under its fourth government in 5
years, the middle class has been wiped out, investment
has stopped, and religious strife and civil disorder are
increasing with no improvement in sight.
Amid the rising discontent and disintegration,
Islamic terrorist groups are becoming aggressive.
Indonesia
is the world’s
largest Islamic country and is strategically located;
over one-third of the world’s sea-borne commerce
passes through Indonesian waters.
The
combination of a sick Japan, an expansionistic China
and an unstable Indonesia
mixed with oil
shortages is an excellent recipe for future conflict
and instability.
But the oil industry is not responding to the prospect of impending
shortages. Capital
budgets are not increasing and worldwide drilling and
exploration activity is down.
Oil prices are too volatile.
Projects that require investments of billions of
dollars that require years to be repaid at low rates of
return are not attracting capital.
In addition, after 20 years of severe
cost-cutting, oil companies are without research
laboratories, experienced staffs or young engineers
trained in petroleum engineering.
Another coincidental aspect of the Iraq
affair was that it
came just when Russia’s president had
reached out to the United States, supporting its war
on terrorism and establishing a rapport with the
American administration. France, who passed Italy
as the largest
purchaser of Russian crude and thus has become the
largest source of foreign income to
Russia, and Germany, the largest foreign
investor in Russia, used their clout
successfully to elicit Russian support for an
anti-Iraq-war position.
France is trying for a
realignment of world power with typical and obvious
French tactics--to ally France with Germany to control
the European Union and, with such a large economic block,
attract Russia into an alliance.
A combination of united European economies with
Russian resources would establish an economic and
political block to rival, and possibly displace, the United States.
This strategy was severely undermined by the rebellion of certain
European countries (the UK, Italy, and Spain), combined
with various Eastern European countries who are not yet
members of the EU but who supported the American
position on Iraq. Jacques
Chirac saw his plans to stop the war thwarted by a
combination of this rebellion against the French
mandates and by Bush’s disdain for European opinion
which were then followed by exposure of close French
relations with Saddam Hussein.
He may have achieved his longer-term goals,
however. Putin
is now actively seeking closer economic ties with the
European Union and has proposed a common market of
Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus, and
Kazakhstan
with the EU that will
be discussed further at an EU – Russia
summit on May 31.
United States
relations and
meetings with Russia
mainly concern
military matters. The
United States
needs to restore the
relationship with Putin and develop and nurture
non-military political and economic aspects.
Oil can be a tool to do that, especially Russian
oil exported to Asia to stabilize a region of continuing Russian
concern. The
U.S.
can also establish
independent free-trade relations with Eastern European
countries and others who supported it with respect to
the war and undermine efforts to develop united European
economic or political strength.
The strike of oil workers in Venezuela, concurrent with
worries about oil supplies from Iraq, revealed the lack of
worldwide surplus productive capacity.
It also focused attention for a short time on the
deterioration of political stability in several Latin
American countries.
If the United States
is to develop secure,
long-term and diverse supplies of oil for world economic
stability, it must devote diplomatic attention to
restoring relations with Russia
and
Latin America
.
As the world’s largest importer, the U.S.
can use oil as a tool
to stabilize the political and economic systems in Russia
and in several Latin
American countries where potential oil reserves are
large and oil production represents a large part of the
economy.
The primary diplomatic objective should be to create favorable
investment conditions in those countries.
Such conditions include favorable fiscal terms,
safe working conditions, lack of corruption, expeditious
bureaucratic action, and a fair system of legal
enforcement and dispute resolution.
In addition, a major requirement is a stable,
long-term oil pricing system, consistent with
expectations of investors in large projects, and must be
at a level that will also stabilize the income stream of
host countries. Reserves
in Russia
and
Latin America
, for technical
reasons, are very large at certain prices but vulnerable
to low prices. Low
oil prices significantly disrupt the economies of those
countries and destabilize their political and social
systems. For
instance, the reserves of the Russian Far East region
are huge at $25 per barrel but are mostly non-commercial
at $10.
An efficient free-market system operates best with minimal government
interference. Government
participation is required, however, to provide an
environment in which a market system can operate safely,
fairly, and efficiently.
Private market participants have no authority to
establish or change international systems.
Only government can use oil as a tool to achieve
international geopolitical objectives.
A relatively simple policy can meet many of these needs.
The U.S.
needs to establish
long-term purchase contracts with supplier countries for
a large portion of their oil exports at fixed, moderate
prices. For
instance, the United States, in a cooperative
government-industry action, could contract to buy
500,000 barrels of oil per day at $25 per barrel from
the Russians at the export terminal on the Pacific for
their planned new pipelines.
Details of amounts and price would be negotiated
specifically; this volume would be about 50 percent of
planned capacity.
Such a policy would provide a stable investment climate for
construction of the pipelines and development of the
fields to supply them.
It would also contribute to stability in the
Russian economy that is dependent on oil for foreign
income, develop secure supplies for the growing Asian
market, complement OPEC’s price structure, and balance
French and other European political influence in Russia
.
Similar contracts should be written with Venezuela,
Mexico,
Argentina, Peru
and Colombia.
The amount, price, and length of the contract
would be specific to each country.
Such contracts would act as a flywheel on the
world oil pricing system, remove investors’ fear an
oil price drop caused by the production they develop
coming on stream, and prevent high price spikes from
disrupting world economies because new diverse supplies
at moderate prices would be available.
The current oil pricing system, establishing oil prices by trading
short-term contracts on the NYMEX, was established in
the early 1980’s to pull price control away from OPEC.
This pricing system worked fine for the last two
decades, a period of surplus supplies, but it no longer
meets our economic or geopolitical needs.
It is time for another change.
Dr. Charles A. Kohlhaas is a former Professor of
Petroleum Engineering at the Colorado School of Mines
and has worked for, founded, managed, and consulted for
major and independent companies in the international oil
and gas industry.
He
has written on questions relating to oil for In
the National Interest
in the January 15, February 12, and
March 5, 2003
issues.
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