Terrorism
and the Peace Process
May 21, 2003
By Paul J. Saunders and Nikolas K. Gvosdev
The recent spate of suicide bombings
in both
Chechnya
and
Israel
demonstrates how easily a "peace process" can
be disrupted by extremists bent on killing innocent civilians and
frustrating any lasting settlement.
Peace has eluded the
Middle East
and
the
Northern Caucasus
because there are still political elements among
Chechens and Palestinians that cling to maximalist aims (the creation of a
Chechen-led Caucasian imamate, the creation of a Palestinian state
encompassing the entirety of
Israel
). Al-Qaeda
has forged links with rejectionists in both camps as a way of further
spreading terror and mayhem.
The fact that Palestinian
rejectionists struck at the exact time when Ariel Sharon and Mahmoud Abbas
(Abu Mazen) were meeting is no coincidence.
It was a blatant attempt to derail the talks--and to throw down a
gauntlet before the Palestinian Authority in an attempt to demonstrate who
really controls the situation among the Palestinians.
Abbas now faces a dilemma similar to
that faced by the
Irish Free State
vis-a-vis the Irish Republican Army in 1921.
The
Free State
ultimately accepted the reality of partition and moved
to suppress terrorism and destroy any "parallel" Irish
government, even when this meant turning against former comrades in the
struggle against the English.
The Palestine Liberation Organization
core of the Palestinian Authority cannot have it both ways.
It cannot simultaneously claim to be the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinians and the embryonic government of a
future state while arguing that it is unable to rein in the rejectionists.
The PA's legitimacy is at stake.
If it wants to be taken seriously, as an institution that
represents Palestinians or a nascent state, it must show real resolve in
destroying terrorist networks determined to undermine the peace process
and imprisoning their leaders. More
broadly, the PA must recognize once and for all that no grievance, no
matter how legitimate, can justify killing civilians.
If the PA acts seriously, it should
be able to count on concrete counter-terrorism assistance--including
training and other technical assistance, financial aid, and intelligence
cooperation--from the
U.S.
Needless to
say, the level of American support should be tightly linked to the
effectiveness of the PA’s work.
At the same time, the
United States
should offer full support to
Israel
in putting an end to terrorist attacks.
If the PA wants
Israel
to limit its own activities in this regard, it should
provide sufficient justification for such steps by taking meaningful
action to end terrorism.
Yasir Arafat’s leadership of the
Palestinians has been repeatedly tested in precisely this manner over the
last decade--and Arafat has invariably failed to fight terror.
Abbas now has a choice.
As David Ignatius pointed out in yesterday's Washington
Post, the roadmap put forth by the
United
States
envisions
helping "the Palestinians build a modern and efficient security
organization that can monitor and ultimately destroy the terrorist cells
that [Yasir] Arafat has winked at or privately sponsored for
decades." Certainly, it
is in his interests to do so, for the suicide bombers do not desire a
modernized, secular Palestinian entity--the alleged goal of the PA--in
fact, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have traditionally viewed the
PLO and its cadres as enemies. Arafat's
attempt--not unlike that of Maskhadov in
Chechnya
--to try and forge a common front between PLO secularists
and Islamists has only strengthened the hand of the extremists.
If the Palestinian Authority’s new
government fails to combat terror, the Israelis will have no choice but to
continue to do so themselves. And
they should know that they have the firm and unambiguous backing of the
United States
.
Paul J. Saunders is director of
The Nixon Center. Nikolas K.
Gvosdev is editor of In the National
Interest.
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